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Patents and Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The
Significance of Patents in Corporate Acquisitions*
RAMON A. KLITZKE**
I. INTRODUCTION
A patent grant constitutes a unique monopoly which is condoned
under the antitrust laws despite its inherently anticompetitive na-
ture.' When coupled with anticompetitive purpose not contem-
plated by the patent statutes and dominant market position, how-
ever, a permissable patent monopoly may violate section 7 of the
Clayton Act.2 For example, the acquisition of a corporation having
a substantial patent position in a particular line of commerce by
an acquiring corporation which can utilize the patents to frustrate
marketing efforts of competitors who sell unpatented products or
use unpatented processes or methods can substantially lessen com-
petition.' The same result can be achieved where a corporation ac-
* © 1981, Ramon A. Klitzke
** B.S.E., J.D., LL.M.; Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; Member of
the Wisconsin, Texas, New York and United States Patent Office Bars.
1. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976), was intended to check anticompe-
titive tendencies in their incipiency, before they reached the point at which the Sherman
Act comes into play. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317, 322, 323, (1962);
United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1978). Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides, in pertinent part-
[That] no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole
or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
3. This could occur where dramatic progress has been made in an industry through the
implementation of patented products or processes and blocking patents have been purposely
acquired by one or two competitors in order to specifically exclude other competitors. See,
e.g., Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). In Hartford,
[t]he [d]istrict [c]ourt found that invention of glassmaking machinery had been
discouraged, that competition in the manufacture and sale or licensing of such
machinery had been suppressed, and that the system of restricted licensing had
been employed to suppress competition in the manufacture of unpatented glass-
ware and to maintain prices of the manufactured product.
323 U.S. at 400. See also text Section III(C) infra.
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quires all or part of another corporation's assets, including impor-
tant patent rights.
This article is intended to provide an analysis of the factors
which should be considered when section 7 challenges to mergers 5
and other acquisitions involve patents. After a review of the courts'
strict approach to challenges of patent acquisitions under the
Sherman Act and the more flexible approach contemplated by sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act, the characteristics of various types of
patent holdings which signal danger in asset acquisition will be an-
alyzed. A discussion of the potential anticompetitive use of patents
acquired in corporate mergers will follow. Finally, a method of
analysis of patent acquisitions will be suggested to enable the prac-
titioner to more accurately predict the section 7 implications of
patent acquisition."
II. PATENTS UNDER THE SHERMAN AND CLAYTON ACTS
A. Patents under the Sherman Act
Patents are unique commodities in the arena of antitrust law.
The patent is a legal monopoly.7 Although this monopoly power in
the hands of the patent owner ascends geometrically when coupled
with other patents related to the same art, naked accretion of the
monopoly power engendered wholly by patent grants themselves
4. Patents have been held to be assets for the purpose of § 7. Dole Valve Co. v. Perfec-
tion Bar Equipment, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 459, 463 (N.D. Ill. 1970); United States v. Lever
Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Therefore, § 7 can be used to thwart
anticompetitive intent based on a dominant patent position if that position is achieved
through acquisitions which otherwise qualify under § 7. See text accompanying notes 27 to
43 infra.
5. As used in this article, the term "merger" will include all transactions which bring
multiple enterprises under permanent unitary control, whether this is technically a merger,
a consolidation, or an acquisition of effective control through the holding company
mechanism.
6. To suggest standards for evaluating the legal consequences of acquiring patent rights
is to invite immediate criticism from many quarters. Antitrust lawyers will argue that the
significance of assets pales when compared with a macro-view of the entire competitive
scene. Patent lawyers will argue that no other assets are comparable to patent acquisitions,
because the degree of monopoly power generated by creative patent licensing and vigorous
patent enforcement is incapable of evaluation over any lengthy period of time. The econo-
mists will argue that the patent grant must assume its appropriate place in the market place
and must partake of the economic forces and laws that govern the acquisition of less eso-
teric assets. Nevertheless, this article offers some observations of the patent phenomenon in
the context of the § 7 acquisition.
7. The courts have recognized that the very object of the patent laws is to create monop-
olies. Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F.
Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978).
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does not result in a violation of the antitrust laws. Thirty years ago
the Supreme Court acknowledged that "[tihe mere accumulation
of patents, no matter how many, is not in itself illegal."8 Whatever
monopoly power the patent owner achieves beyond that produced
by "the mere accumulation of patents," however, is viewed by the
courts with well-deserved suspicion.
Prior to the enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914,1 the anticom-
petitive effect of patent acquisitions in corporate mergers could be
attacked only under the Sherman Act.10 The fact that market
dominance might be achieved through the merger of corporations
having powerful patent positions did not call for a stricter test
than mergers involving other factors, even when the surviving cor-
poration appeared to attain a commanding advantage. In United
States v. Winslow," the United Shoe Company was created
through the merger of three corporations, each of which was domi-
nant in different types of shoe machinery. The shoe machines were
patented, thus allowing Justice Holmes to observe that they consti-
tuted "a monopoly in any case. 1 2 Becuase the three groups of pat-
ented machines did not directly compete with each other, it was
difficult for Justice Holmes "to see why the collective business
should be any worse than its component parts."" He could "see no
greater objection to one corporation manufacturing 70 percent of
three noncompeting groups of patented machines collectively used
for making a single product than to three corporations making the
same proportion of one group each.""' The merger was therefore
held not violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act.15
A Sherman Act violation was found to exist, however, and was
affirmed per curiam by the Supreme Court in United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp.6 In that case, more than 2,000 shoe
8. Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 834
(1950). See also Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637
(1947).
9. 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-11 (1976).
11. 227 U.S. 202 (1913).
12. Id. at 217.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. The result in Winslow could have differed markedly had § 7 been available at that
time. Although the patents were non-competing, they were complementary and they were
utilized by United Shoe in achieving and maintaining its market dominance, which was
some 70 percent of the market.
16. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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machinery patents had been acquired, about five percent of them
from sources outside of the corporation. Although the district court
did not rely on the defendant's patent power to find a violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act, it did reject totally the defendant's
arguments that the patent accumulation was of business necessity
(1) to protect against infringement suits, (2) to avoid blocking de-
sirable developments, or (3) to settle patent controversies. The
court instead turned these arguments against United Shoe:
"[M]ost of these purposes could have been served by non-exclusive
licenses. Taking the further step of acquiring the patents. . . but-
tressed United's marketing power. In some instances . ..the ac-
quisitions made it less likely that United would have competi-
tion. ' 17 Thus, the patent owner may violate section 2 of the
Sherman Act when (a) the manner of patent accumulation suggests
anticompetitive intent, (b) the quantity of patents accumulated ex-
ceeds normal needs, or (c) the accumulated patents are used as
entry barriers against potential competitors.
B. Enactment of the Clayton Act
The Clayton Act was the congressional answer to the apparent
leniency of the courts in evaluating mergers under the Sherman
Act.18 The 1914 Act addressed the acquisition of stock where the
effect was to substantially lessen competition between the acquir-
ing and acquired corporations, or to tend to create a monopoly.19
The acquisition of assets, however, was not included in the first
version of the statute and presumably was not of paramount im-
portance to Congress. 20 This meant that, under a straightforward
interpretation of the statute, a corporation could buy the patents
of another corporation with impunity, even if those patents com-
17. 110 F. Supp. 295, 333 (D. Mass. 1953).
18. Prior to the enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914, mergers enjoyed singular success
when attacked under the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court's "rule of reason" approach
seemed to encourage the tide of mergers which characterized many industries before World
War I. The Supreme Court initially held that all mergers between directly competing firms
violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. United States v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61
(1912); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). With the advent of the
"rule of reason" in Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), mergers
began to be tested under a less stringent rule. In United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S.
417 (1920), the Court held that a consolidation of 80 percent to 90 percent of steel-produc-
tion capacity violated neither § 1 nor § 2 of the Sherman Act.
19. 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)).
20. Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. F.T.C., 291 U.S. 587 (1934), held that asset
acquisitions were not covered by the original Act.
[Vol. 12
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prised the major assets of a patent holding company and the ac-
quisition gave the buyer complete dominance in a particular
market.A further loophole in the coverage of the original section 7 was
the failure to reach vertical acquisitions, despite the proportion of
a market which could thereby be foreclosed to competitors. Al-
though it is unlikely that the patents held by corporations at dif-
ferent levels of the chain of distribution of a product or service
would be directly competing, if the corporate survivor of such a
merger owns a key patent in a raw material production process or a
manufacturing machine, substantial leverage could then be exerted
at more than one level of distribution. In this way, the accumula-
tion of a number of patents could confer greater monpoly power
than the simple additive sum of the power of the patents. If pat-
ents owned at one level of the distribution chain relate to products
or methods of another level, monopoly power could be further
magnified.
To close these gaps in section 7 coverage, Congress amended sec-
tion 7 by the enactment of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act of
1950.1 The acquisition of assets was added to the proscribed acts22
under the statute, and the requirement that the substantial lessen-
ing of competition had to be between the acquired and acquiring
corporations was deleted.'s The present language of section 7 thus
affords a much stronger weapon with which to challenge mergers
involving patent acquisition . 4 Under the Sherman Act, an anti-
trust violation can arise only after the acquiring corporation actu-
21. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125.
22. In adding acquisition of assets to § 7 by the Celler-Kefauver Act, Congress intended
to expand the coverage of § 7 to include direct acquisitions of assets, as well as indirect
acquisitions, as through a subsidiary or otherwise. See H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 8-9 (1949).
23. The Supreme Court later thought this deletion unnecessary. United States v. E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). The Court held that.
any acquisition by one corporation of all or any part of the stock of another corpo-
ration, competitor or not, is within the reach of the section whenever the reasona-
ble likelihood appears that the acquisition will result in a restraint of commerce or
in the creation of a monopoly of any line of commerce.
Id. at 592.
24. The grand design of the original § 7, as to stock acquisitions, as well as the
Cellar-Kefauver Amendment, as to the acquisition of assets, was to arrest incipi-
ent threats to competition which the Sherman Act did not ordinarily reach. It
follows that actual restraints need not be proved. The requirements of the amend-
ment are satisfied when a "tendency" toward monopoly or the "reasonable likeli-
hood" of a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market is shown.
United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1964).
1981] ° 405
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ally uses the acquired patents to bring about an anticompetitive
effect." Section 7, on the other hand, is concerned with potential
anticompetitive effect.2 The role of patents and the question of
monopoly power under section 7 is, therefore, much more sensitive.
There is far greater potential for anticompetitive abuse of patents,
which are inherent monopolies, than there is for other assets. Pat-
ents should therefore be prime targets for merger analysis under
section 7.
C. Patents As Assets Under Section 7
Patent acquisitions are subject to section 7 because they are per-
sonal property" and thus are assets within the meaning of the
statute." The key question in a section 7 violation is the degree to
which patents may increase the likelihood of a lessening of compe-
tition or of creation of a monopoly in the merger process. Because
the courts thus far have not addressed this question, no guidelines
have been established to assess the likelihood of anticompetitive
effect in a merger involving significant patent interests. Analogies
can be drawn, however, from cases involving other kinds of assets.
It is not difficult to find ample Supreme Court precedent for the
importance of considering assets in challenged mergers. The quan-
tity of assets owned by the principal corporations is a decided in-
fluence in these decisions. For example, in United States v. Phila-
25. Under the Sherman Act, a stable of patents is of little consequence when monopoly
power is "thrust upon" the monopolist. The "thrust upon" defense to an allegation of mo-
nopolization originated in Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945): "It does not follow because 'Alcoa' had such a
monopoly, that it 'monopolized' the ingot market: . . . monopoly may have been thrust
upon it." Immediately upon the utilization of patents for anticompetitive effect beyond
what was intended by the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1976), however, the monopoly
power becomes tainted, whether or not there is a direct exercise of that monopoly power.
26. See note 23 supra.
27. Dole Valve Co. v. Perfection Bar Equipment, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
Cf. Transparent-Wrap Machinery Co. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 645 (1947); Wil-
son v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. 646 (1846); United States v. Lever Brothers, 216 F. Supp. 887
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
28. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 104 (1969); Dole
Valve Co. v. Perfection Bar Equipment, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 459, 463 (N.D. Ill. 1970). See also
Automated Building Components, Inc. v. Trueline Truss Co., 318 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Ore.
1970) (patent application); Smith-Corona Marchant Inc. v. American Photocopy Equipment
Co., 217 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (trademark); United States v. Columbia Pictures
Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (exhibition rights); Farm Journal Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26
(1956). Even "know-how" may be an "asset" within Clayton § 7. See United States v. Allied
Chemical Corp. [1964] Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,193; United States v. CIBA Corp., [19701
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 73,269.
Patents in Corporate Acquisitions
delphia National Bank,29 the second and third largest banks of
forty-two commercial banks in the Philadelphia metropolitan area,
proposed to merge. After the merger, the surviving bank and the
next largest bank would have had, between them, 59% of the total
assets of all banks in the area; the four largest banks would have
had 78% of the total local assets.30 The Court held that section 7
forbade the merger. Although the opinion of the Court emphasized
the proportion of the relevant market that would be foreclosed by
the merger, the significance of the amount of assets controlled was
not ignored by the Court.
A further example of the primacy of quantity of assets in a sec-
tion 7 case is demonstrated in United States v. Phillipsburg Na-
tional Bank and Trust Co..81 There, the defendant banks respec-
tively ranked 1,346th and 2,429th nationally among United States
banks with trust powers."' The proposed merger would have re-
sulted in the second largest bank in the relevant geographical area
with 19.3% of the total assets." The three largest banks in the
area would then have increased their holdings from 60% to 68%.
This concentration of assets was sufficient for the Supreme Court
to hold that this could constitute a violation of section 7.34
Analogous reasoning would apply in a strictly quantitative view
of patent assets in a proposed merger. It is not necessary, to be
subject to section 7, for the merging corporations to own massive
quantities of assets if the relevant geographical market is suffi-
ciently restricted. Patent assets frequently form the basis for a
highly restricted product market. Significant monopoly power can
be readily concentrated in a few firms controlling basic patent
rights in a particular technology.
In these section 7 cases, the Supreme Court invariably dwells
upon the quantity of assets held by the merging corporations. The
quality of the assets receives little attention. One rare example of
attention to the character of the accumulated assets is the Court's
opinion in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co. .35 Two corpo-
29. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
30. Id. at 331.
31. 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
32. See Justice Harlan's "wonderment" that the Justice Department should bother to
sue such small banks. Id. at 373.
33. Id. at 357.
34. The case was remanded to determine the convenience and needs issue under the
merger approval section of the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (c)(5)(B) (1976).
35. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
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rations which owned assets of $860 million and $100 million, re-
spectively, entered into a joint venture by forming a third corpora-
tion to produce and sell sodium chlorate in the southeastern
United States. One of the parent corporations, Olin Mathieson
Chemical Corporation, owned valuable patent rights, while the
other parent, Pennsalt Chemical Corporation, for years had en-
gaged in sodium chlorate production. The joint venture corpora-
tion was formed to enter a relevant market that was already mo-
nopolized by two other producing companies having assets of
almost $200 million and $100 million, respectively.
The Court's decision is replete with references to the accumula-
tion of assets and the production capacities of the competitors." In
holding that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint, the
Court pointed out that Olin Mathieson and Pennsalt each had suf-
ficient resources to enter the southeastern United States market
alone without the necessity of the joint venture.37 The test that the
lower court should have applied was whether either corporation,
given these great resources, would have entered the market by
building a plant, not whether both of them would have built a
plant in the relevant market area.38 The case stands for the pro-
position that the character of assets, as well as their quantity, may
be determinative of the final result under section 7.
Overall, however, the Court's primary focus has been upon the
quantity, and not the quality, of assets. This is understandable
when readily liquifiable pecuniary assets are in issue. The Court
can easily translate the acquisition of such assets into anticompeti-
tive power. Readily liquifiable, pecuniary assets offer the means by
which valuable resources can be controlled and predatory market
practices supported. Thus, the quantity of these assets properly is
the measure of potential anticompetitive effect.
Singular attention to the quantity of assets is inappropriate,
however, when the acquisition involves non-pecuniary assets. Non-
pecuniary assets are not readily liquifiable and their acquisition
cannot be easily translated into potential anticompetitive effect. It
is often the quality or nature of non-pecuniary assets, and not
their quantity, that will potentially lessen competition or create a
monopoly. The quantification of likely anticompetitive effect is
often impossible. For example, the goodwill that a corporation has
36. Id. at 162-66, 172, 175.
37.. Id. at 175.
38. Id. at 175-76.
[Vol. 12
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developed through judicious trademark advertising may be worth
millions of dollars, but quantification of that value may be impos-
sible. Similarly, an advantageous geographical location gives a cor-
poration a distinct advantage over competitors, but the pecuniary
value of. the location defies numerical assessment.
As a non-pecuniary asset, intellectual property (patents, trade
secrets, trademarks and copyrights) is similarly incapable of pre-
cise. assessment in terms of competitive advantage, particularly if
the property has yet to be exploited. The myriad of ways that dy-
namic property rights in ideas can be exploited offer numerous op-
portunities to artificially disrupt the normal patterns of supply and
demand. It is for this reason that intellectual property deserves
special attention under section 7. Patents, as the most exclusive
kind of intellectual property, must be given careful examination in
the merger situation because the potential for anticompetitive mis-
use may substantially transcend whatever pecuniary value has
been assigned to them.
III. ACQUISITION OF PATENT RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 7
The patent grant is a unique monopoly which allows its owner to
exclude others from making, using, or selling an inventive idea. Its
character is not directly comparable with other forms of property.
The right to exclude others from making, using, or selling an in-
vention can be, in the case of a major advance in the art, the right
to exclude all other competitors from the market if the invention
completely supplants whatever preceded it.59 In terms of intrinsic
value, patents differ immeasurably. A major advance in a particu-
lar field of technology warrants a strong patent with broad
claims. 0 If a landmark invention generates a patent, 1 the Patent
Office will issue a patent having fewer elements in the claims and
the elements themselves will be broadly defined in the specifica-
tion.'2 It will not be easy for competitors to "invent around" such a
patent or to make or sell strongly competing products or processes
39. Such exclusions existed for a time in photocopying technology. See SCM Corp. v.
Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 991-94 (D. Conn. 1978), and for the Polaroid camera.
40. "Claims" are the numbered paragraphs at the end of the patent specification which
particularly define the scope of the invention protection. They are the predicates of a sen-
tence that may begin, "What I claim as my invention is .. " See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
41. An example is the patent awarded for the first photocopy machine. See note 39,
supra.
42. L.e., the description of the invention and how it is used or produced. See 35 U.S.C. §
112 (1976).
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without infringing one or more of the claims. Most patents, how-
ever, are not of this nature. The average patent is an improvement
over an existing article of manufacture, a machine, or a process
and relatively narrow claims are allowed by the Patent Office.
Many patents may be easily "invented around" by devising a prod-
uct or process which will be as economically attractive as the pat-
ented item, but which will not infringe the patent claims.
It is significant to section 7 analysis whether or not patents are
acquired by merger or through asset acquisition. Patents acquired
through merger are usually coupled with other assets, except where
a pure patent holding company is acquired. It is the ultimate pur-
pose or effect of the merger in its entirety that interests the court.
The singular importance of the patent assets may be lost in the
judicial analysis of the proportion of the market that is controlled
through the merger or the quantity of total assets controlled by the
surviving corporation. In non-merger patent acquisitions, it is
likely that much closer attention will be given to the underlying
reasons for acquiring the particular patent rights. The character of
the patent right will assume greater importance and should lead to
a scrutiny of the strength of the patent, i.e., the degree to which it
is a major advance in its technology, thus allowing the domination
of one or more markets.
In either case, however, the courts should focus not only upon
the quantity of the patents acquired, but upon the quality of the
patent rights as well. The courts' analysis should be directed to the
nature of the patent right, whether the patent claims are strong or
weak, as well as the state of the technical art in which the patents
have been granted. Of these factors, the nature of the patent
rights, which ranges from complete and full ownership to only a
limited license, 3 is especially important to meaningful analysis.
Patent licensing, in particular, lends itself to a number of creative
means for stifling competition which may precipitate a section 7
violation.
A. Patent Licenses
Merchantable property rights in most forms of intellectual prop-
erty are sui generis because business competitors can utilize the
property effectively without exclusive possession of the complete
43. Outright and complete ownership of a patent grant clearly constitutes an "asset"
under § 7. See cases cited in note 28 supra. Whether all other forms of patent rights are
assets under § 7 is debatable.
[Vol. 12410
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property right. Unlike most forms of personal property, a patent or
trademark can be rented, i.e., licensed, to a number of business
competitors without a noticeable decline in pecuniary value. Multi-
ple licenses of a patent may even increase the patent's value if new
competitors find it necessary to acquire a license to enter the mar-
ket. The value of intellectual property declines if the property be-
comes freely available to all competitors. This occurs when a trade-
mark has become the generic term for a product or when an
antitrust defendant is ordered to offer royalty-free licenses of a
patent to all of its competitors to correct previous misuse of the
patent.
Thus, the value of intellectual property is tied to the degree of
exclusivity controlled by its users. The degree of exclusivity in the
use of patents varies widely because of the myriad ways licenses
can be used to control the marketing efforts of licensees. Licenses
may be exclusive or non-exclusive. The geographical area of the
license may be wide or narrow. The license may contain one or
more of a number of rights or restrictions having direct bearing on
the capability of either the licensee or the licensor to compete in a
given relevant market. Extremely complex problems of evaluation
flow from such variables. Exclusivity of rights, whether related to
type of product, field of use, class of customers, or geographical
area, directly affects the degree to which the license may lessen
competition or create a monopoly. A single, non-exclusive license
may be innocuous by itself, but when coupled with a substantial
number of additional licenses in the same field, it may give the
licensee dominant monopoly power in a particular market.
Whether or not a patent license, as opposed to patent ownership,
constitutes an acquisition under section 7 is less than clear. An ex-
clusive license is undoubtedly an acquisition in most instances, but
a non-exclusive license, if sufficiently restricted, may not constitute
an acquisition under section 7. The term "acquisition" is broad
and it would follow that most licenses do constitute acquisitions."
Some licenses, however, may not. The acquisition of a narrow, non-
exclusive license granting the right to only a limited use of a pat-
ented article, but not the right to make or sell it, may be an acqui-
sition of virtually nothing. There is a point at which the recipient
of a patent right does not acquire anything, within the meaning of
an acquisition under section 7, if the restrictions imposed so limit
44. That Congress intended the term "acquisition" to be broadly interpreted is borne
out by the legislative history. See H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1949).
1981]
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the use of the right such that little or no potential value flows to
the recipient.
It has been argued that most non-exclusive patent licenses are
not assets under section 7 because they are merely contractual
promises to refrain from suing for infringement. 5 It has been alter-
natively argued that such licenses are assets because the licensee
has purchased a valuable and practical right to make, use, or sell
an invention for competitive advantage." A non-exclusive license
is not an acquisition of the entire bundle of patent rights, but it is
a property right, created by contract, which seems to be within the
contemplation of the section 7 terminology.47
In adjudicating cases under section 7, the courts may frequently
resolve the issue of asset acquisition not by dissecting the charac-
teristics of the patent or the type of grant, but by applying the
ultimate test in the statute. Only those acquisitions that may sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly are pro-
scribed by section 7. The magnitude of the right acquired and the
quality and strength of the licensed patent determine the anticom-
petitive possibilities. There is no need to stop to analyze whether
or not an asset exists, or whether there has been a clear-cut acqui-
sition, if the anticompetitive effect is obvious. If anticompetitive
purpose or effect is found, then any argument that there was no
asset acquisition fails because the anticompetitive effect itself is
evidence that there was an asset acquisition of some value. If no
anticompetitive effect is possible, it is immaterial that an asset or
acquisition exists. Even when a court is prognosticating future an-
ticompetitive effect, such effect must be premised on whatever
practical use can be made of the license by the defendant, whether
or not it is an "asset" and whether or not there has been an
"acquisition". 48
45. See Davis, Patent Licensing and the Anti-Trust Laws: Some Recent Developments,
46 J. PAT. OF. Soc'v 12, 30-31 (1964); Weinstein, The Application of Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act to Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, 5 PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. OF
RESEARCH & EDUCATION 328, 333-34 (1961).
46. See Murchison, Patent Acquisitions and the Antitrust Laws, 45 TEX. L. REv. 663,
692-93 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Murchison]. See also U.C.C. § 1-201 (32) (1972 version):
a "purchase" includes "any. . . voluntary transaction creating an interest in property."
47. See United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 181-82 (S.D.N.Y.
1960). This case contains an excellent discussion of the meaning of the terms "acquire" and
"assets". The case involved a nonassignable license of copyrighted feature films for
television.
. 48. This analysis is, of course, less appropriate for a corporate merger which involves the
acquisition of numerous, different assets. In such a merger, it will be difficult to ascertain
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B. Grant-Back Provisions
An extraordinarily anticompetitive tool frequently used in pat-'
ent licensing is the grant-back provision. The licensee agrees to
grant any improvement patents or related patents back to the li-
censor when these are developed by the licensee during the term of
the license. The ostensible justification for the grant-back provi-
sion is to protect the patent owner from erosion of the original pat-
ent's value due to possible technical improvements by the licensee
to the licensed invention. Improvements are generally physical ad-
ditions to, or changes in, the patented article or process. Generally,
once such improvements are developed, the original invention is no
longer marketable without the improvements. These improve-
ments, moreover, cannot be separately exploited because they are
an integral part of the patented article or process.49 Without a
grant-back provision, the original invention belongs to the patent
owner while the improvements belong to the licensee. This creates
an impasse: the owner of the improvements cannot practice them
without permission from the patent owner while the patent owner
has no right to practice the improvements without the permission
of the licensee.
The grant-back provision usually extends to all improvements,
whether or not patentable,"o and even amorphous "know-how" fre-
quently is included within the provision.51 The grant-back can be
an exclusive or non-exclusive license. It can even provide for the
conveyance of any patents on the improvements obtained by the
licensee. It might cover only improvements to the licensed inven-
tion or might include all inventions in a given technical field, not
necessarily only those related to the licensed invention." This re-
whether the potential anticompetitive effect would arise from the use of the non-exclusive
license or from some other acquired asset. Such a determination would have to be made at
the remedy stage of the proceedings.
49. Although the improvement attaches to the patented invention, the improvement
may be sufficiently inventive to be eligible for a patent itself. Even if the improvement is so
obvious as not to warrant a patent grant, trade secret protection might be available to the
owner of the improvement.
50. See note 49 supra.
51. "Know-how" usually constitutes a trade secret, which is an asset within the scope of
§ 7. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., [1972] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 73,993 (cus-
tomer lists and sales routes).
52. See Antitrust Subcommittee B, Grant-Back Patent Licensing, A.P.L.A. BULL., Sept.
1966, at 387-402. See also ArroRNsY GENERAL's NATIONAL COMMITrEE TO STUDY TM ANTI-
TRUST LAws 227 (1955); Dunne, Anti-Competitive Considerations of Patent Accumulation
by Licensee Grant-Back Provisions, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 124, 128 (1975).
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quirement has the effect of solidifying the licensor's position in the
technical art related to the patent. The licensee is firmly locked
into a continuing relationship with the licensor because, although
the grant-back provision is effective only during the term of li-
cense, the grant-back normally is a conveyance of rights which sur-
vives the term of the license, as in the case of a patented improve-
ment. Sometimes an alternative provision requires the developer of
the improvement to grant only a non-exclusive license. If the term
of this license is of sufficient length, however, the competitive ad-
vantage gained by the beneficiary of the grant-back can be as valu-
able as a full conveyance of the complete property right.
Although grant-back provisions facilitate exploitation of im-
proved inventions, they often provide the original patent owner
with excessive control over the improved article or process. If the
grant-back is a right ancillary and complementary to the patent
licensing right, it should not, to be justifiable, extend the patent
monopoly beyond the scope of protection contemplated by the pat-
ent statute. The statutory protection allows the patentee to take
what steps are necessary in order to prevent any diminution of the
fair return to which he is entitled.58 If the patent license is em-
ployed, this often takes the form of a reasonable royalty. To assure
a fair return, courts even permit the licensor to fix the price of the
patented article if a percentage royalty is based upon the article's
total sales."
Still, the practical effect of the grant-back provision is to reach
far beyond the protection of the patentee's fair return. The grant-
back allows the patentee to acquire other inventions not initially
included in the patent license and not invented by the patentee.
Furthermore, although a patentee cannot license his invention for
any term beyond the expiration date of the patent,55 the grant-
back provision often extends the licensor's monopoly beyond the
seventeen-year patent term because the grant-back always is of in-
ventions subsequent to the licensed patent. To avoid this, grant-
53. See Antitrust Subcommittee B., Grant-Back Patent Licensing, A.P.L.A. BULL.,
Sept. 1966, at 387-402. Another reason given by the courts is that the grant-back provision
will do no harm. See Turner, Antiturst Enforcement Policy, 29 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECT. 187,
188 (1965) (hereinafter cited as Turner]. See also Stedman, Acquisition of Patents and
Know-How by Grant, Fraud, Purchase and Grant-Back, 28 U. Prrr. L. REv. 161, 170-71
(1966).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 227 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Mich. 1964), a/I'd
by an equally divided court, 382 U.S. 197 (1965).
55. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
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back rights should expire simultaneously with the original patent
rights.
It is therefore clear that the acquisition of patent licenses con-
taining grant-back provisions deserves special consideration under
section 7. To properly evaluate the degree to which the acquisition
of such licenses is anticompetitive, a thorough analysis of the state
of the technical art is essential. The specific inclusiveness of the
grant-back language must be examined to determine the scope of
the restraint on the licensee. A long-term license requiring full con-
veyance of all of the licensee's patent developments, trade secrets,
and knowhow constitutes a serious threat to other competitors be-
cause the licensor's monopoly is appreciably expanded. On the
other hand, a grant-back provision in the license of a weak patent
with narrow claims would not be a serious threat to competition if
the patented invention represented only a nominal advance in the
pertinent art and the improvements could not enhance the
strength of the patented invention.
Grant-back provisions have not been unfavorably received by
the courts. In Transparent Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes &
Smith Co., 56 the licensee was required to assign all improvements
patents back to the licensor with no further consideration. The Su-
preme Court held, 5 to 4, that the provision was not per se illegal.
On remand, the Court of Appeals found no antitrust violation. 7
The case was decided on a narrow set of facts, however, and the
court observed that grant-backs could conceivably violate the anti-
trust laws. In a subsequent case, a district court distinguished
Transparent Wrap on its facts and reached a contrary holding. In
United States v. General Electric Co., 8 all dominating patents in
the "hard metals" art were owned by G.E. and its position was
strengthened by grant-backs in all of its licenses. The district court
found this to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act and distin-
guished Transparent Wrap as being only a controversy between
two small companies without extensive market control. 9
No clear path is obvious to the practitioner faced with grant-
56. 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
57. Stokes & Smith v. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., 161 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1947).
58. 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
59. A similar result and similar reasoning obtained in United States v. General Elec. Co.,
82 F. Supp. 753 (1949), which involved G.E.'s control of incandescent lamp patents. See also
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), which involved
the basic dominant patents for the manufacture of alumina, licensed by a dominant corpo-
rate power.
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back patent rights which may raise antitrust problems. Some cases
follow Transparent Wrap and find grant-backs do not per se vio-
late section 7. 0 The Justice Department, however, considers i-
cense grant-backs to be per se violations,6' and has negotiated con-
sent decrees prohibiting grant-backs.2 The Department's major
objection to grant-backs is their tendency to reduce the incentive
to invent and thus frustrate the major purpose of the patent
laws.63
C. Pooling and Cross-licensing of Blocking and Complementary
Patents
Another anti-competitive use of patent rights is the pooling of
multiple patents in a particular industrial art. The exclusive bene-
fits of such pooling are usually extracted through careful licensing
and sublicensing, and the antitrust laws are often violated in the
process. One use of pooling is to acquire complementary patents.
Patents are complementary when each patent covers a closely re-
lated but separate facet of a process or product. The strength of
the interrelationship of complementary patents exceeds the aggre-
gate strength of the individual patents. The value of the group is
measured by analyzing the entire process or product which is con-
trolled and the offensive strength of the body of patents vis-A-vis
other competitors who do not have the patented inventions.
Patents may also be used defensively. One competitor in an in-
dustry can use blocking patents to prevent other competitors from
achieving technological progress in the industry. Blocking patents
most frequently exist when step-by-step progress in a particular
technology is marked by patented inventions at each step. One
competitor can acquire numerous patents along this chain of pro-
gress, not for the purpose of practicing these patents, but simply to
exclude competitors. By refusing to license the acquired patents,
the competitor can effectively block other competitors. Alterna-
60. See, e.g. Binks Mfg. Co. v. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 281 F.2d 252 (7th Cir.
1960); Swofford V. B. & W., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 811 (S.D. Tex 1966); Sperry Products, Inc., v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 171 F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Ohio 1959); International Nickel Co., v.
Ford Motor Co., 166 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
61. Turner, supra note 53, at 188, 192.
62. See United States v. Wis. Alumni Research Foundation, [1970] Trade Cas. (CCH)
73,015 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
63. See Address by Richard H. Stern, Chief of Antitrust Division, Patent Unit of the
Department of Justice, reprinted in [1971] PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) no.
47, D-2.
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tively, the owner of a basic patent can block the production of im-
proved articles by refusing to license his patent to the owner of the
improvement patent, and vice versa. Each patent blocks the other
competitor from the improved invention.
To achieve the strength of complementary patents and avoid the
stalemate caused by blocking patents, patent owners will often
pool their patents and license the rights to use all the patents in
the pool. These pools can sometimes contain hundreds of patents.
Another method to achieve this result is cross-licensing of patents
where individual owners of complementary and blocking patents
license to each other the rights to use their respective patents.
Pooling and cross-licensing are quite similar in effect and are fre-
quently used interchangeably. A series of cross-licensing agree-
ments is sometimes termed a patent pool by the courts.
The acquisition of a pool of patents or a series of cross-licensing
agreements necessitates careful consideration under section 7. Pat-
ent pooling is, by its very nature, highly anticompetitive in effect
and usually is embraced for that very purpose. Competitors at-
tempt to justify pooling in terms of convenience, arguing that by
this means a large number of licenses need not be individually ne-
gotiated. It must be recognized, however, that the patent pool is an
aggregation of monopolies of inventions and its potential for les-
sening competition or creating a monopoly is substantial.
Sound policy considerations, however, militate against blanket
condemnation of all forms of pooling and cross-licensing. The Su-
preme Court approved the principle of patent pooling as "neces-
sary if technical advancement is not to be blocked by threatened
litigation" in Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States." The
Court found, in commenting on the permissability of patent pool-
ing, that "[i]f the available advantages are open on reasonable
terms to all manufacturers desiring to participate, such in-
terchange may promote rather than restrain competition." 65 Subse-
quent decisions also have cited the public interest as a factor sup-
porting cross-licensing, particularly as a means to prevent blocking
patents. 66 The positive role of patent interchanges has been sum-
64. 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931). The defendants had control of petroleum cracking
processes by means of seventy-nine patent contracts. The Court held there was no violation
of §§ 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act.
65. 283 U.S. at 171. In an earlier case, United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913), the
Court stated that the pooling of complementary patents had no adverse effect at all and
consequently could not be viewed as a violation of the antitrust laws. Id. at 217.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry and Machine Co., 139 F. Supp.
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marized as follows:
The technological interdependence of a vast number of patents
and their legal mutual exclusiveness frequently necessitates ex-
change or waiver of patent rights. Patent interchanges may help
resolve patent conflicts and thus make the assembled patents
available to others. They may facilitate patent licensing of a mul-
tiplicity of patents, or make possible the use of mutually depen-
dent or blocking patents. Patent interchange may thus promote
rather than restrain competition.61
Nevertheless, a word of caution is in order, lest the practitioner
become overconfident in assessing a possible violation of section 7.
The same public interest that necessitates public access to block-
ing or complementary patents stands in the way of any merger
which, in the name of public interest, concentrates undue domina-
tion of a particular technology. To fuse complementary or blocking
patents into convenient packages for the purpose of making li-
censes reasonably available to competitors may at first blush ap-
pear to promote competition. If there is a probability that such
licenses may not be forthcoming, however, the potential for mo-
nopolization may overcome the public interest in the fusion. The
result of a section 7 challenge then would be dictated not by public
interest, but by the fundamental antitrust policy of preventing any
lessening of competition. Simply touting the public interest in the
advantages of combining complementary or blocking patents does
not end the section 7 inquiry. The patent pool still may obstruct
competition if improperly utilized. Because section 7 applies where
the potential for monopolization exists, the possibility of perver-
sion of the positive aspects of the patent pool must be taken into
consideration."8
IV. POTENTIALLY ANTICOMPETITIVE UTILIZATION OF PATENT
RIGHTS
The patent grant is no ordinary asset and the range of patent
rights requires careful analysis in the application of section 7 of
the Clayton Act. The interface between section 7 and its antithesis,
244, 259 (W.D. Pa. 1956); International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 730 (9th Cir.
1964).
67. ATroRny GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITIEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRusT LAws, 242-43
(1955).
68. See Murchison, supra note 46; Turner, supra note 53, at 156.
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patent law, is complex and fraught with pitfalls.69 The prophylactic
nature of section 7 permits a more flexible analysis than is possible
under other antitrust statutes.7 0 This permits the courts some lee-
way in dissecting the patent aspect of a merger.7' It is difficult to
predict precisely how the analysis will proceed, however, because
patent rights rarely have been the focus of section 7 challenges,
particularly where they are merely one of many assets in a merger.
Two areas of antitrust case law may be useful in suggesting some
general guidelines for patent asset analysis: (1) decisions involving
scarce resources; and (2) decisions scrutinizing a course of business
conduct. Most antitrust cases involving patents are under sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act or section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, but they are to some extent applicable to section 7
cases because the tests of substantial lessening of competition and
tendency to create a monopoly are also used under those statutes.
In addition to this case law, a framework of analysis for patents
may be helpful in isolating the unique characteristics of patents
which merit consideration under section 7 analysis.
A. Analogous Antitrust Caselaw
Unique and limited resources are qualitatively similar to patent
assets and therefore merger cases involving such resources may be
drawn upon for guidance in assessing mergers involving patents. It
has been held that where a limited resource is acquired in an
amount which exceeds reasonable need, monopolization may be
found. For example, the corporate acquisition of the largest U.S.
producer of potash was held to violate section 7 where potash
reserves were in short supply and the potash industry was highly
concentrated.72 In another case, a finding of monopolization was
69. See W. BowMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRusT LAW (1973).
70. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1976). See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S.
486 (1974); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271
(1964).
71. A clear purpose of the 1950 amendment was to substantially strengthen § 7:
The purpose of the proposed legislation is to prevent corporations from acquiring
another corporation by means of the acquisition of its assets, whereunder (sic) the
present law it is prohibited from acquiring the stock of said corporation. Since the
acquisition of stock is significant chiefly because it is likely to result in control of
the underlying assets, failure to prohibit direct purchase of the same assets has
been inconsistent and paradoxical as to the overall effect of existing law.
S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950).
72. United States v. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), 253 F. Supp. 196 (D.N.J. 1966).
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based on a company's deliberate pre-emption of bauxite and
water-power resources by acquisitions beyond normal future sup-
ply needs.73
It should be emphasized that a section 7 violation occurs when a
degree of exclusionary power is attained that will permit a sub-
stantial lessening of competition and when an exercise of that
power is possible. The question in patent asset acquisitions, as in
the case of scarce resources, is whether the accumulation of pat-
ents has exceeded current or reasonably foreseeable needs. For a
corporation to vigorously outbid all other competitors in acquiring
every patent even remotely related to its technology is to abso-
lutely foreclose entry to a wide market. The patent statutes con-
template vesting of monopoly power but they were not intended to
allow the patent owner, by pyramiding monopoly power, to control
unpatented areas closely related to the patented products.4
The parallel between scarce resources and patent assets is most
evident in cases involving blocking patents or patent misuse. De-
liberate enforcement of blocking patents to prevent potential entry
of competitors into a market has the same effect as the hoarding of
scarce resources.7 5 In United States v. Singer Mfg. Co.,7 6 a classic
blocking patent case brought under the Sherman Act, a patent ap-
plication for a zig-zag sewing machine was acquired to exclude Jap-
anese machines from the U.S. market. The Court found this to be
an unlawful conspiracy. The same result would obtain if the same
patent assets were acquired in a merger." A section 7 violation in-
deed has been found where a patent application was acquired from
a failing company for the purpose of excluding competition. 78 Simi-
larly, it has been held that the acquisition of a patent solely for the
purpose of asserting it against another, and the continued assertion
of the patent in litigation, constituted patent misuse.7 Acquisition
73. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432-33 (2d Cir. 1945). See
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTiTRu T § 179 (1977).
74. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 179 at 509 (1977) and cases
cited therein.
75. See Section III(C) supra.
76. 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
77. See Van Cise, Antitrust Laws and Patents, 52 J. PAT. O". Soc'Y 776 (1970) [herein-
after cited as Van Cise]. See also R. NORDHAUS, PATENT ANTITRusT LAW §§ 10-4 to 10-6.
78. Automated Building Components, Inc. v. Trueline Truss Co., 318 F. Supp. 1252 (D.
Ore. 1970). See also R. NolLA us, PATENT ANTITRUST LAW §§ 10-7 to 10-9.
79. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 757 (D.S.C. 1977). The
leading case on patent misuse is Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
Patent misuse is a broader doctrine than patent antitrust violation. Some conduct classed as
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of patents in a merger for a similar purpose could be a violation of
section 7.
A second line of case law useful to section 7 patent analysis in-
volves those decisions utilizing the judicial technique of examining
specific business conduct with which the defendant either achieved
or maintained market domination."0 The greater the proportion of
the market monopolized, the greater is the importance of those
acts which brought about or perpetuated the monopolization.
Moreover, business conduct during the period in which the monop-
oly was being created assumes major importance, even though that
conduct could be described as merely the exercise of good business
judgment at the time."1
This judicial technique for analyzing exclusionary conduct,
originating in Sherman Act cases, is also well-suited to section 7
patent cases. Where a corporation acquires a homogeneous group
of patents that encompass a definitive market area, the court need
only determine the degree to which possession of the group ham-
pers competition or constitutes a serious barrier to entry by new
competitors. If the corporation is equipped to produce the pat-
ented articles of manufacture, then the traditional tests for degree
of market control will indicate the new accretion of market power.
If production facilities of the corporation do not permit it to use
the inventions, the court must question whether the acquisition is
for negative, anticompetitive purposes. Although subsequent con-
duct by the corporation may exonerate the corporation," the court
in a section 7 action must address the question of potential an-
ticompetitive effect or purpose at the time the acquisition is con-
templated or undertaken.
A court should have little difficulty in finding a section 7 viola-
patent misuse may not be an antitrust violation, although remedies imposed are quite simi-
lar. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). A special
remedy used in patent misuse is a requirement that the fruits of the misuse be fully dissi-
pated before the patent can again be enforced against infringers.
80. Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) has been the model for this technique for over 35 years. The busi-
ness decisions of the monopolist are suspected of being exclusionary in purpose.
81. The "rule of reason," however, permits some justification of those decisions if the
proportion of the relevant market controlled has not reached a critical level. Standard Oil
Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
82. If subsequent to the acquisition, the corporation brings only a few, isolated infringe-
ment suits after requesting the infringers to pay a reasonable royalty under licenses, then
the anticompetitive purpose or effect is not as apparent and a "rule of reason" approach
may exonerate the acquisition.
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tion when a patent holding company is involved and the patents,
although not directly relating to the business of the acquiring cor-
poration, do relate to the activity of a competitor. The acquisition
of a patent holding company quite easily can violate section 7,83
especially if the holding company's patent pool includes a substan-
tial number of important patents in a field of technology. 4 Monop-
olization of the key patents in a defined market cannot help but
chill the capability of others to compete with products produced
under those patents.
Acquisitions of patents for the purpose of suppression also de-
serve special attention. The motive of a patent owner becomes sus-
pect when he acquires a patent with no intention of utilizing or
licensing the invention. A common reason for suppressing a patent
is that the patent owner is tooled-up for the production of a com-
peting product and it is not feasible to produce the patented in-
vention. If the royalties which could be obtained from licensing the
patent to competitors would not make up for the reduction in sales
of the competing product, the patent owner maximizes his gross
receipts by suppression of the patent. If this suppression has the
purpose or effect of substantially lessening competition, then the
acquisition violates section 7.
Suppression of a patent is an untoward perversion of the lawful
patent monopoly. Although the Patent Act requires only full and
complete disclosure of the patented invention," the progress of the
"useful arts" requires production and utilization of the invention.
Patent suppression has been found violative of the Sherman Act 6
83. See Smith-Corona Marchant, Inc. v. American Photocopying Equip. Co., 142
U.S.P.Q. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
84. See Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 423 (10th Cir. 1952).
85. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1976). The primary consideration the public receives for confer-
ring patent monopoly power upon the patent owner is the full and complete disclosure of
the invention in the publication of the "specification". This permits the invention to be
freely made and sold at the expiration of the 17 year term. To view the purpose of the
Patent Act so narrowly, however, is to misconstrue the true meaning of the constitutional
provision which authorized the Act. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, par. 8:
The Congress shall have power. . . to promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries.
86. An attempt to make profit out of letters patent by suppressing the invention
covered thereby is outside the patent grant, and is so far removed from the spirit
and intent of the patent law that the mere fact that an inventor may make a profit
by suppressing his invention is not a sufficient reason for holding the Sherman act
inapplicable to agreements affecting patented articles.
Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 166 F. 555, 560 (D. Mass. 1909).
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and'the same considerations dictate a violation under section 7 of
the Clayton Act.87 Here again, however, there is the problem of
determining, at the time of acquisition, whether there will be fu-
ture suppression. In some instances, this may be obvious, as where
it would be impossible for the acquiring corporation to make or use
the invention because of resource limitations or lack of access to
essential raw materials. In other circumstances, the likelihood of
suppression may not be so clear.
B. A Framework for Section 7 Patent Analysis: The Murchison
Approach
Most courts, in adjudicating section 7 cases, find no need to in-
vestigate the possibility of patent suppression, patent misuse, or
the specific species of patent use that may result in substantial les-
sening of competition or monopolization. The courts appear to be-
lieve that if a merger results in a powerful patent position, that
position itself is evidence of anticompetitive purpose or effect.8 Al-
though this may attain a correct result, it leaves much to be de-
sired in terms of analysis of patent assets. One scholar, John L.
Murchison, Jr., has suggested a practical answer to the knotty
problem of the application of section 7 to specific patent acquisi-
tions.as Murchison sees two primary questions in section 7 analysis:
first, when are there likely to be anticompetitive effects, and sec-
ond, what considerations should be taken into account in framing
rules to stop undesirable acquisitions.9
87. See Van Cise, supra note 77, at 785-86.
88. In A.G. Spalding and Bros., Inc. v. F.T.C., 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962), the merged
corporation, formerly Spalding and Rawlings, held significant patent rights in sporting
equipment, generally, and lines of baseballs, specifically. The Federal Trade Commission's
order of divestiture was upheld because of the § 7 violation. Rawlings had been one of the
four largest of 200 firms engaged in the manufacture of athletic goods and held patent rights
to eighty inventions, although none for baseballs. Patents were found to be a primary factor
in Spalding's substantial lead in the baseball market, id. at 618, even though Spalding as-
serted that it licensed applicants under all of its patents. Id. at 619. The court observed that
four of the largest manufacturers of athletic goods had active research and development
departments and regularly filed a generous number of patent applications. This factor, the
court noted, loomed large in giving these companies their respective leading positions in the
athletic goods industry. This concentration was determinative in the court's decision to af-
firm and enforce the F.T.C. order of divestiture. Id. at 620. Cases such as Spalding teach
that patents lend themselves quite easily to numerous exclusionary practices and show that
accumulations of patents by the monopolist are rarely overlooked by the courts. On the role
of patents in exclusionary practices, see 3 P. ARMEDA & D. TutNmi, ANwrmusT LAw ch. 7B
(1978).
89. See Murchison, supra note 46.
90. Id. at 697.
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Murchison focuses his inquiry by differentiating between acqui-
sitions of unexploited and commercially exploited patents. Patents
are further divided into those that may be practiced without in-
fringing others and those that would infringe others. In the latter
group are improvement patents and overlapping patents, i.e., pat-
ented inventions which must be practiced simultaneously in a par-
ticular art and which are complementary to each other.91
Murchison would condemn the exclusive acquisition of unex-
ploited patents if the acquisition would create or further expand
market power. Alternatively, only those exclusive acquisitions by a
dominant firm in the relevant market would be prohibited. In ei-
ther case, the exclusive acquisition of patents equivalent or inferior
to existing patents of the acquiring corporation also would be pro-
hibited.92 Murchsion admits that it is difficult to determine
whether a patent may confer market power.93 This is not an insur-
mountable obstacle, however, if it is kept in mind that every pat-
ent confers market power and only market power resulting in a
substantial lessening of competition is to be condemned.
In the case of the acquisition of patents that have already been
commercially exploited, the analysis would be much simpler." The
share of the market controlled by the patent is known. The court
has but to combine the market shares controlled by the merging
corporations and compare the total with that controlled by other
firms in the relevant market. It should not be difficult to assign a
portion of the market to a particular patent. The indirect effect
that the patent has on potential competition, however, would be
much more difficult to ascertain. Competitors do not enter a mar-
ket controlled by patented products or processes unless adequate
licenses can be obtained at reasonable royalty rates. Lacking such
licenses, potential competitors might attempt to "invent around"
the patents and devise economical substitutes. This is a specula-
tive decision, however, and the research and development costs are
often prohibitive.
For the purposes of section 7, it is reasonable to divide patent
acquisitions, as Murchison suggests, into commercially exploited
and unexploited patents. Pecuniary values for the former are easily
calculated. Evaluation of the latter is wholly conjectural and they
91. Id. at 698.
92. Id. at 698-705.
93. Id. at 701, 718.
94. Id. at 726-31. See United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
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should not be analyzed in the same way as exploited patents.
Moreover, patent licenses require additional analysis because, un-
less the licensee has begun production under the license, the an-
ticompetitive effect on the market cannot be measured. This is
true even if the patent has been practiced by others because it is
the market power of the licensee which will determine the degree
of anticompetitive effect once production under the license is
begun.
Furthermore, improvement and overlapping patents should be
distinguished from patents that may be practiced without infringe-
ment. The acquisition of a series of improvement or overlapping
patents confers substantially greater monopoly power than a series
of independent patents. Independent patents sometimes can be
avoided by creative alternative invention or can be directly at-
tacked in declaratory judgment suits. A web of improvement or
overlapping patents is not as susceptible to such measures because,
as one or two patents fall, others are immediately available to fur-
ther trouble competitors.
Additionally, when applying section 7, a comparison should be
made between the market strength of the patents to be acquired
and the strength of patents in the possession of other competitiors.
The patents to be acquired may be equally as strong, i.e., they may
command an equal share of the market as attractive alternatives.
On the other hand, they may command a lesser share of the prod-
uct market. If process or machine patents are involved and identi-
cal products are marketed by all competitors, then the strength of
the patent is determined by the saving in material costs, labor, or
time when the patent is practiced. A merger or acquisition which
strengthens the patent position of the surviving corporation en-
hances competition when powerful patents are held by competi-
tors. If the patents to be acquired have already been exploited, the
competitive picture after the proposed acquisition will be readily
discernible. Unexploited patents pose a difficult problem, but mar-
ket strength can to some extent be estimated by examining the
state of the technology and analyzing the breadth of the patent
claims that have been awarded.
VI. CONCLUSION
No single approach to the question of patent acquisition can be
a panacea to cure the difficulty in evaluating these assets under
section 7. Judicial standards may be as diverse and varied as the
myriad of techniques that artistic lawyers have devised to extend
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the power of the patent grant into peripheral, unpatented areas.
The time-honored tests for lessening of competition and monopoli-
zation will serve well, however, if the intricacies of the patent posi-
tions of the merging corporations are carefully dissected and indi-
vidually examined. More is required than a nodding acquaintance
with the exclusionary power of the patent grant and a passing
glance at the quantity of patents involved in the merger. The spe-
cial monopoly power of the patent grant must be fully understood
if the anticompetitive potential of patent assets are to be
appreciated.
